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Abstract. We propose a mechanism for shock ampliﬁcation that poten-
tially can account for fat tails in the distribution of the growth rate of
national output. We argue that extreme macroeconomic events, such as
the Great Depression and the Great Recession, were preceded by signiﬁ-
cant turmoil in the banking system. We have developed a model of bank
network formation and presented numerical simulations that show that,
for the benchmark case, aggregate credit follows a random walk. When
we introduce ﬁre sales the model does not only produce larger variations
in the growth of aggregate credit but also shows that there is an asym-
metry between booms and busts that is also consistent with empirical
evidence.
Keywords: Systemic risk · Banking system · Aggregate risk · Financial
network · Fat tails
1 Introduction
The two most severe macroeconomic crises of the last 100 years, namely, the
Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession that commenced at the
close of the ﬁrst decade of the current century, were preceded by extreme events
in ﬁnancial markets in general and the banking system in particular. In a recent
study, Schularick and Taylor (2012) have empirically identiﬁed a historical link
between the level aggregate credit in the economy and macroeconomic perfor-
mance. They argue that aggregate credit can be a powerful predictor of economic
crises, especially, rare catastrophic events.
Our aim is to provide a microfoundational explanation for the above relation-
ship. In this work we focus on the behavior of aggregate credit. In particular, we
analyze the dynamics of aggregate bank credit in an economy where all ﬁnancial
transactions are intermediated through the banking system. Viewing the ﬁnan-
cial system as a network of banks that are connected through their ﬁnancial
obligations to each other, we examine how the impact of shocks on the asset side
of the banking balance sheets may disrupt the supply of aggregate credit.
Each period the capacity of a bank to ﬁnance new projects depends on the
size of its balance sheet which, in turn, depends on the success rate of the
projects that it ﬁnanced the period before. Each period, the total capacity of
the banking system to ﬁnance new projects entirely depends on the aggregate
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liquidity available within the system. At the beginning of each period each bank’s
available liquidity (reserves) is equal to the sum of its household deposits plus
its equity.
Projects are allocated sequentially and randomly across banks. A bank that
faces a demand for funds but has run out of liquidity can borrow from other
banks. This process creates a network of banks where its links, that reﬂect inter-
bank exposures, are both directed and weighted.
As banks are unable to completely diversify their loan portfolios they can
become insolvent. This will be the case when the total loan repayments (from
both entrepreneurs and other banks) are insuﬃcient to cover their obligations
to their depositors and other banks. In order to clear the banking system when
some banks become insolvent we apply the method suggested by Eisenberg and
Noe (2001). Insolvencies can propagate through the banking network. When one
bank is unable to meet its obligations to another bank, the latter bank might
itself become insolvent even if it would have remained solvent had its loans to the
originally failed bank been repaid. The bankruptcy resolution process terminated
when there are no insolvent banks left. The number of bank failures will depend
on (a) the distribution of initial losses across the banking system, and (b) the
structure of the ﬁnancial network (see, for example, Acemoglu et al. 2015).
As long as the liquidation of assets held by insolvent institutions does not
depress the market values of these assets the total systemic losses by the end
of the resolution process will be equal to the initial losses due to the inability
of entrepreneurs to repay their loans. However, as Shleifer and Vishny (1992)
have argued during systemic episodes, exactly because there are many failing
institutions, the market value (liquidation value) of the assets can drop below
their corresponding book values (ﬁre sales). These drops in asset prices forces
other institutions to reevaluate their own assets thus potentially causing new
rounds of failures.1
In our model, when we do not allow for ﬁre sales, the value of aggregate
credit provided by the banking network follows a random walk. This is because
the capacity of the banking network to provide credit each period depends on the
availability of reserves which in turn depends on the performance of aggregate
loans the period before. Given that shocks are normally distributed each period
it follows that aggregate lending activity follows a random walk. When we intro-
duce ﬁre sales we observe that systemic losses can be much greater than initial
losses thus introducing fat tails on the lower end of the distribution of aggregate
credit. Under the supposition that aggregate credit is positively correlated with
aggregate output our approach might be useful for accounting two features of
business cycles: (a) the asymmetry in booms and busts (Acemoglu and Scott,
1991), and (b) macroeconomic fat tails Acemoglu et al. 2017a).
Our work is related to many strands of the economics literature. Our main
premise is that bank leverage can be the source of systemic risk which in turn
can lead to fat tails in the distributions of many macroeconomic aggregates.
1 For models of ﬁre sales see Diamond and Rajan (2011) and Caballero and Simpsek
(2013). For a review of the literature on ﬁre sales, see Shleifer and Vishny (2011).
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The relationship between leverage in ﬁnancial markets and fat tails is also
addressed by Thurner et al. (2012).
In recent years a number there have been some attempts to build network
models of the economy that can account for the fat tails in the distribution of
the growth rate of national output. This literature has been motivated by the
inability of traditional DSGE models to account for such fat tails (see Ascari
et al. 2015). Acemoglu et al. (2012, 2017a) have analyzed production networks
where the aggregate eﬀects of idiosyncratic shocks depend on both the initial
distribution of shocks and the structure of the network.2 Anthonissen (2016)
considers dynamic versions of similar economies. Thurner et al. (2012) show
how leverage, through bankruptcies, can exacerbate volatility.
There is also a growing related literature that develops agent-based models to
study the relationship between ﬁnancial markets and the macroeconomy. Ashraf
et al. (2017) integrate a banking sector with an agent-based economy where
the source of turmoil is the market for goods. In contrast, in our work we view
the ﬁnancial sector as the one being responsible for the ampliﬁcation eﬀects
on shocks. Battiston et al. (2007) consider the propagation of bankruptcies in
production networks while the source of system risk in Geanakoplos et al. (2012)
is the housing market. For an empirical investigation of the relationship between
the macroeconomy and systemic risk, see Giglio et al. (2016).
Lastly, our work is related to a very large literature that uses network analysis
to address issues related to systemic risk in banking systems. The interested
reader is referred to the literature reviews on this subject by Acemoglu et al.
(2017b), Babus and Allen (2009), Bougheas and Kirman (2015), and Glasserman
and Young (2016).
2 The Model Without Fire Sales
Time is discrete (t = 0, 1, ...); each period t is divided into sub-periods (τ =
0, 1, ...). There is a set of n banks with a typical element bi , where (i = 1, ..., n).
Table 1 shows the general form of a bank balance sheet:
Table 1. Bank balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Reserves: Ri Deposits from Households: D
H
i
Loans to Households: LHi Deposits from other Banks: D
B
i
Loans to Banks: LBi Equity: Ei
There is a single divisible good that banks can (a) hold as reserves, (b) lend
it to households to ﬁnance projects, and (c) lend it to other banks. Banks accept
2 See Carvalho (2014) for an overview of this approach.
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deposits form households and from other banks (loans from other banks). We
assume bank equity is given by:
Ei ≡ Ri + LHi + LBi − DHi − DB1 (1)
Further, the following condition must hold for any closed bank network:
∑n
i=1
LBi =
∑n
i=1
DBi
We set the net interest rate on household deposits rD equal to 1, the net interest
rate on household loans rL equal to 1θ (given (a) limited liability debt contracts,
and (b) zero-proﬁt condition for risk-neutral banks), and the net interest rate on
interbank loans rB equal to 1+θ2θ (nash-bargaining splits the diﬀerence between
the interest rates on households loans and household deposits between the two
banks).3
At the beginning of each period t (τ = 0) the balance sheet of bi is shown on
Table 2 (all entries are endogenously determined):
Table 2. Bank balance sheet at (τ = 0)
Assets Liabilities
Ri0  0 DHi0  0
LHi0 = 0 D
B
i0 = 0
LBi0 = 0 Ei0  0
Projects. Projects require 1 unit of investment, last for one period and yield
a stochastic return. With probability θ they yield a gross return Z and with
probability 1 − θ they fail yielding nothing, where θZ  1. Projects returns are
independently distributed.
Network Formation. The demand for project ﬁnancing is inﬁnitely elastic.
Projects are ﬁnanced sequentially and the allocation of projects to banks is
random. As long as there exists at least one bank with reserves greater of equal
to unity the banking system will keep ﬁnancing new projects. Thus, the aggregate
credit provided each period will be approximately equal to aggregate reserves.4
Suppose that bi is allocated a project. If Ri  1, bi oﬀers a loan and the following
two changes take place on its balance sheet ΔLHi = +1 and ΔRi = −1. If Ri < 1
then bi randomly selects another bank, say bj and request an interbank loan.
3 It will become clear below that our qualitative results are not sensitive to the
processes by which the three interest rates are determined.
4 To keep the program simple we do not allow projects to be ﬁnanced by multiple
banks. This means that aggregate lending might be less that aggregate reserves.
However, given that the number of banks is small relatively to the amount of aggre-
gate reserves this simpliﬁcation will not have any qualitative inﬂuence on our results.
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If Rj  1, bj oﬀers an interbank loan to bi and the latter ﬁnances the project. The
balance sheet changes for the two banks are given by: ΔDBi = +1, ΔL
H
i = +1,
ΔRj = −1 and ΔLBj = +1. If Rj < 1 then bi repeats the process by randomly
selecting one of the remaining banks. The whole process terminates when no
bank has reserves greater or equal to unity. At the end of the network formation
process (τ = 1) the balance sheet of bi is shown on Table 3:
Table 3. Bank balance sheet at (τ = 1)
Assets Liabilities
Ri1 < 1 D
H
i1  0
LHi1  0 DBi1  0
LBi1  0 Ei1  0
Household Loan Repayments. Close to the end of period t project returns
are realized and loans granted for successful projects are repaid. Despite the fact
that project returns are independently distributed the ﬁniteness of a bank’s loan
portfolio implies that bank equity can take negative values, that is banks can
become insolvent. Now, balance sheets also reﬂect the interest payments due.
Table 4 shows the bank balance sheet after loans are repaid or written oﬀ but
before the interbank market clears (τ = 2):
Table 4. Bank balance sheet at (τ = 2)
Assets Liabilities
Ri2  0 DHi2 = DHi1
LHi2 = 0 D
B
i2 =
1+θ
2θ
DBi1
LBi2 =
1+θ
2θ
LBi1 Ei0 ≷ 0
Reserves have been augmented by loan repayments. As projects last only one
period all loans to households are either repaid or written oﬀ. Identity (1) is used
for the calculation of bank equity.
Bankruptcy Resolution Process (No Fire Sales). All banks with negative
equity are insolvent and they will be liquidated. The proceeds of the liquidation
process will be distributed pro rata to all the liability holders. In this section, we
assume that the market value of liquidated assets are equal to their book values.
That is, for the moment, we assume no ﬁre sales. Below we extend our model
by including ﬁre sales. We follow the method proposed by Eisenberg and Noe
(2001) for clearing the banking network. This procedure, at least for the case with
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no ﬁre sales, is independent of the order that insolvent banks are liquidated.5
This is because interbank loans are only settled after the bankruptcy resolution
process is completed. Completion implies either that all remaining banks are
solvent or that no banks are left. Below we describe the algorithm that we used
to implement the procedure.
If there are any banks with negative equity choose one randomly, say bi. Let
λ ≡ DHi2
DHi2+D
B
i2
; the ratio of household deposits to total deposits. Let dji denote
the liabilities of bi to bj (interbank loan from bj to bi). Let lki ≡ dik denote
an interbank loan from bi to bk.6 Then, the assets of bi will be distributed to
its creditors pro rata as follows7: The depositors of bi will receive a fraction λ
of (a) Ri2, and (b) lki for all k (1, ..., n).
8 Each bank bj such that d
j
i > 0 will
receive a fraction d
j
i
DHi2+D
B
i2
of (a) (a) Ri2, and (b) lki for all k (1, ..., n). Given that∑n
j=1 d
j
i = D
B
i2 the above process will redistribute all the assets of bi to its two
classes of creditholders.
Next consider changes on the balance sheets of all other banks following the
resolution of bi. Consider any bank bj such that d
j
i > 0 and any bank bk such
that dik > 0. Then,
1. bk will set its liabilities to bi equal to zero: Δdik = −dik;
2. bk will increase its household deposits: ΔDHk2 = λd
i
k;
3. bk will increase its deposits by bank bj : Δd
j
k =
dji
DHi2+D
B
i2
dik;
4. bj will set its loan to bi equal to zero: Δlij = −lij ;
5. bj will increase its loans to bank bk: Δlkj =
dji
DHi2+D
B
i2
dik.
This will end the bankruptcy procedure for bi. Notice that given that some
of the creditors of bi were not fully repaid it is possible that some banks that
before the above process were solvent now they are insolvent. If there are any
banks insolvent then by choosing one of them randomly the whole procedure
repeats itself. If there are no more insolvent banks the bankruptcy resolution
process terminates. After the resolution process all the assets of insolvent banks
would have been distributed between their depositors and the remaining banks.
5 Uniqueness is achieved under very mild conditions. In the Appendix we provide a
numerical example.
6 According to the network formation process of our model it is possible that both
LHi2 and D
H
i2 to be positive. However, you cannot have a pair of banks where each
one has oﬀered a loan to the other.
7 In this work we have followed Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and have assumed that
all creditors are treated equal. As Acemoglu et al. (2015) have shown the clearing
process can easily be modiﬁed to allow a class of creditholders (e.g. depositors) to
have a priority claim over the bank’s assets. There is an ongoing debate over the
design of optimal priority rules for banks (for a review of the relevant literature see
Bougheas and Kirman 2016).
8 Clearly lii = 0, and l
k
i = 0 if bi has not oﬀered a loan to bk.
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Interbank Market Clearing. Given that all remaining banks are solvent all
outstanding loans in the interbank market can be settled. After the interbank
market is cleared the balance sheets of solvent banks will have exactly the same
form as those at τ − 0.
Dynamics. In order to complete the description of the model we need to specify
how the initial balance sheets are formed, what happens to the banking systems
after some banks failed and what happens to the depositors of failed banks.
At t = 0, each bank is randomly allocated reserves, R, drawn form a uniform
distribution with support [0, R¯]. Household deposits are set equal to a ﬁxed ratio
δ of reserves. Thus, bank equity is equal to (1 − δ)R.
At the end of each period t, new banks enter to replace the ones that have
been insolvent. We make this assumption to ensure that the banking system does
not vanish. It would then seem natural to have households whose original banks
became insolvent to deposit their funds at the new banks. However, there is a
problem. On one hand, new banks, on average, would be smaller in size as their
depositors have suﬀered losses. On the other hand, given that the allocation of
projects to banks is random these new banks would by disproportionately highly
indebted to other banks and given that their equity levels would also be low they
would fail again with a high probability. Put diﬀerently, the dynamics of the
system would be such that in the long-run the banking system would artiﬁcially
become very highly concentrated. There are two possible ways to avoid this
problem. The ﬁst one, and the one that we have followed in this paper, is to
have all reserves randomly redistributed in the system. While this approach
is much simpler and, as a result, our main results very easy to interpret, it
destroys some interesting dynamic interactions. The second approach is to allow
households who had deposits at failed institution to have them now depositing
their funds at the new banks but now change the network formation process so
that banks with higher reserves have a higher probability of being allocated a
project. This second approach is more realistic, however, when we introduce ﬁre
sales, it makes it more diﬃcult to assess the exact mechanism that produces the
distribution of aggregate credit shocks.
Lastly, we adjust equity and deposits at each bank so that at the beginning
of t + 1 the ratio of deposits to reserves is equal to δ.9
3 Results Without Fire Sales
The number of banks that will become insolvent each period would depend on
three factors. The ﬁrst factor is the realized proportion of successful projects.
Even if each project fails with probability 1 − θ, the economy is ﬁnite and
the law of large numbers does not hold. The resulting aggregate uncertainty
implies that the realized proportion of successful projects will vary over time.
9 The recapitalization is clearly necessary for all new banks that otherwise would begin
with no equity.
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The second factor is the distribution of failed projects across the banking system.
Other things equal, the more uneven this distribution is the higher the numbers
of insolent banks will be. The third factor is the structure of the banking net-
work. Acemoglu et al. (2015) have shown that as long as the initial losses are not
to large a more connected banking system can provide a buﬀer against contagion
as losses are distributed across many banks. In contrast, when initial losses are
large a less connected system might prevent such contagion.
Even if it is diﬃcult to predict the number of banks that will fail following
an aggregate shock, the level aggregate of credit provided by the banking sys-
tem follows a well deﬁned pattern. At the beginning of each period t aggregate
credit is approximately equal to aggregate reserves, Rˆt.10 Projects that are suc-
cessful boost reserves and equity of the banks that ﬁnanced them. The losses of
the projects that failed are initially absorbed by the equity of the banks that
ﬁnanced them. If this equity is not large enough to absorb the losses then the
creditholders of the bank absorb the losses, that is its depositors and other banks.
Fig. 1. Aggregate credit, no ﬁre sales
10 The approximation qualiﬁcation is due to the fact that we do allow banks to co-
ﬁnance projects and thus aggregate credit is less than or equal to aggreagte reserves
but more than or equal to aggregate reserves minus the number of banks. Given that
the number of banks is relative to the level of aggregate reserves is relatively small
in what follows we ignore this approximation.
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Thus when the process ends all losses have been absorbed either by the deposi-
tors or equityholders. Given that at the end of the period all liquidation proceeds
are redeposited in the banking system aggregate credit follows a random walk
(with drift if θZ > 1).
Rˆt+1 = Rˆt + εt
Notice that the error term depends on the realized number of successful projects
and thus it is binomially distributed, however, the fact that the number of
projects is large implies that the distribution is approximately normal.
The introduction of ﬁre sales below complicates signiﬁcantly the dynamic
behavior of the model and we will have to use calibrations. Below we present
calibration results for the benchmark case when ﬁre sales are set equal to zero.
Numerical Results. For our calibration exercise we set the following parameter
values: n = 20, R¯ = 100, θ = 0.8, Z = 1.25, and δ = 0.8. In this particular case
there is no growth as θZ = 1. The four panels of Fig. 1 show four of aggregate
credit for 100 periods, while the four panels of Fig. 2 show the corresponding
runs of the ﬁrst diﬀerences of aggregate credit activity. These examples just
verify our assertion that without ﬁre sales the dynamic path of aggregate credit
not inconsistent with a random walk process.
Fig. 2. First diﬀerences of aggregate credit, no ﬁre sales
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4 The Model with Fire Sales
In our model the only assets that banks hold when they get liquidated are
reserves and loans to other banks. In reality banks would hold many other assets
including outstanding loans to households. When banks are forced to liquidate
any assets, either loans to households (ﬁrms) or any other liquid assets that
they hold as reserves, the prices of these assets can fall below their book values.
Such a fall in prices can be the result of either (a) asymmetric information
problems arising from allocating assets, such as loans to ﬁrms, to new creditors,
or (b) price externalities generated when many institutions are attempting to
sell their assets at the same time. The ﬁrst to consider ﬁre sales within a ﬁnancial
equilibrium framework was Shleifer and Vishny (1992). More closely relate to
our work Caballero and Simsek (2013) have considered ﬁre sales in a banking
network.11
As we have demonstrated in the section above, without introducing liqui-
dation costs the aggregate performance of the banking system is completely
determined by the realized distribution of initial shocks. Put diﬀerently, the net-
work structure only aﬀects the distribution of gains and losses across the system
but not their aggregate value.
When we analyzed above the bankruptcy resolution process for the case
without liquidation costs we noted that insolvent banks distribute their reserves
Ri2 pro rata among their creditors. The presence of liquidation costs implies that
now the value of reserves (liquid assets) distributed Ri3 will be lower than Ri2.
Below we consider two alternative ampliﬁcation mechanisms for aggregate
shocks.
Linear Liquidation Costs. Suppose that when a bank’s assets (reserves) are
liquidated they lose a fraction f of their book value. Thus, we have
Ri3 = (1 − f)Ri2
The linearity restriction refers to the fact that f is independent of the number
of banks that become insolvent, nˆ  n. The availability of aggregate credit
at the beginning of the next period will depend on how the following three
factors aﬀect nˆ: (a) the aggregate value of loan repayments (b) the distribution
of loan repayments across the network, and (c) the structure (topology), g, of
the network.
Without liquidation costs the evolution of aggregate credit depended only
on the aggregate value of loan repayments. However, with the introduction of
liquidity costs the performance of aggregate credit will now depend on the other
11 For assets that are not liquid traditional ‘mark to market’ accounting evaluation
methods tend to exacerbate such problems. This is because such asset reevaluations
might also aﬀect institutions that are not directly connected with institutions that
have become insolvent. In our work we are unable to capture such eﬀects given that
we do not explicitly allow for illiquid assets.
Systemic Risk and Macroeconomic Fat Tails 129
two factors.12 For a given network structure, the total losses would depend on
how connected the aﬀected banks are. For example, isolated banks do not impose
any external eﬀects. But the total losses would also depend on the structure of
the network itself (see Acemoglu et al. 2015).
Thus, whether or not the linear case is suﬃcient to produce fat tails in the
distribution of aggregate credit would depend on how the last two factors aﬀect nˆ.
Non-Linear Liquidation Costs. In this case we allow for the liquidation cost
to depend on the number of banks that become insolvent. Suppose that bi is the
jth bank that is liquidated. Then, we let
Ri3 = (1 − f)j Ri2
The idea here is that as the number of banks that become insolvent increase the
more depressed asset values become.
Fig. 3. Aggregate credit, ﬁre sales
12 The ampliﬁcation mechanism is asymmetric as it aﬀects only losses. However as we
will see below, even if the initial aggregate shoch is positive, that is the number of
successful p[ojects is greater than θ , depending on the distribution of failed projects
across the banking system it is still possible that aggregate credit declines.
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5 Results with Fire Sales
We use the same parameters as for the case without ﬁre sales and we also set
f = 0.05.
There is one additional complication when we introduce ﬁre sales. We have
noted above that for the case without liquidation costs the ﬁnal outcome of the
bankruptcy resolution process does not depend on the exact sequence by which
insolvent banks are liquidated. Unfortunately, this is not the case anymore. We
control for this complication by allowing for multiple randomizations after we
reach that stage.
The four panels of Fig. 3 show four of aggregate credit while the four panels
of Fig. 4 show the corresponding runs of the ﬁrst diﬀerences of aggregate credit
activity. Comparing these ﬁgures with the corresponding ﬁgures obtained in the
case without ﬁre sales we make the following observations. From Fig. 3 we ﬁnd
that aggregate credit almost vanishes. This is because the asymmetry of the
ampliﬁcation mechanism. While there is nothing to boost the performance of
institutions that are unaﬀected by bankruptcies those that are aﬀected are suf-
fering from additional losses due to ﬁre sales. Without compensating by allowing
for growth, that is θZ > 1, the distribution is not stationary. Nevertheless, Fig. 4,
at least in the early periods when the size of the banking system is still relatively
large, clearly shows that the magnitude of negative shocks has increased.
Fig. 4. First diﬀerences of aggregate credit, ﬁre sales
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These preliminary observations provide hints that our proposed mechanism
might account for both the fat tails and the asymmetric nature of the distribution
of aggregate economic activity over time.
6 Conclusion
We have suggested that some of the properties of the time series of aggregate
output might be accounted by the behavior of aggregate credit activity. Our work
provides a microfoundations explanation for the relationship between the pro-
vision of aggregate credit and macroeconomic crises observed by Schularick and
Taylor (2012). In particular, we have argued that by analyzing the causes of
systemic risk in the ﬁnancial system can potentially help us understand both
the presence of fat macroeconomic tail risk and the asymmetry between booms
and busts along the business cycle.
We have captured systemic risk through an interbank network with links
representing interbank exposures. Each period banks borrow and lend to each
other so that they can ﬁnance loans to households that are randomly allocated
across the banking system. Given that households loans are risky and lack of
complete diversiﬁcation the loan portfolio of each bank is also risky and banks
can become insolvent. By applying standard methods for the bankruptcy res-
olution process we have captured the process of contagion across the banking
system as failing banks put at risk their own creditors and thus providing a
measure of systemic risk.
We have presented some preliminary numerical results where we compare two
versions of our model, namely, one with and one without ﬁre sales, for the case
when there is no economic growth. For the case without ﬁre sales we have shown
that aggregate credit follows a random walk. The introduction of ﬁre sales has
signiﬁcantly ampliﬁed negative shocks on aggregate credit. Without a stabilizing
mechanism at the limit aggregate credit vanishes. Below we discuss our plans
for extending the present work.
Our ﬁrst priority is to allow for growth by setting θZ > 1 so that the dis-
tribution of the growth rate of aggregate credit becomes stationary. We will be
able then to compare the moments of the distribution for the two versions of our
model and thus provide a quantitative assessment of the ability of our model to
produce both fat tails and asymmetries in the distribution of aggregate credit.
As we explained in Sect. 2, unless we introduce a mechanism for rebalancing
the system we would end up with some small-size banks being heavily indebted
and thus repeatedly failing. In order to avoid this from happening we have, at
the end of each period, redistributed deposits across the banking system. Doing
so has allowed us to keep the network formation process completely random.
We plan to explore an alternative method where larger banks face a higher
demand for household loans. This is a more natural way to model the banking
system, however, the disadvantage is that we introduce another potential source
of variation in the model, mainly tails in the distribution of the size of banks,
that could also aﬀect systemic risk. However, comparing the two methods we
should be able to disentangle these eﬀects.
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Another important task would be to try to improve our understanding of the
relationship between network structure and systemic risk. We can do that by
producing estimates for network measures (e.g. average degree, centrality) for
each period of our model and then by checking how these measures are correlated
with the corresponding growth rates of aggregate credit at the end of the period
and the aggregate shock at the beginning of the period.
Lastly, our plan is to embed the whole banking structure in an agent-based
model of the whole economy so that we can assess how ﬂuctuations in the supply
of credit are related to booms and busts of the economy. At the minimum, we
would hope that our model would account for the fat tails in the growth rate of
aggregate economic activity and the asymmetry in the patterns between booms
and busts. However, by also allowing for an endogenous growth process we would
hope that the more general framework would also provide an account not only for
the long-term growth patterns of economic activity but also for the persistence
in aggregate shocks.
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A Appendix: Numerical Example
We present an example that demonstrates how the bankruptcy resolution process
works and why the outcome is independent of the order of bank resolutions.
There are three banks: b1, b2 and b3. For ease of exposition we have set all net
interest rates equal to 0. The balance sheets of the three banks at the beginning
of the period are given by (Table 5):
Table 5. A1: Initial balance sheets
b1 b2 b3
R 1 1 1
LH 0 2 2
LB 1(b2) 1(b3) 0
Assets 2 4 3
DH 1 2 1
DB 0 1(b1) 1(b2)
E 1 1 1
Liabilities 2 4 3
Suppose that all projects failed. Then the three balance sheets after the
writing oﬀ of losses are given by (Table 6):
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Table 6. A2: Balance sheets adjusted for losses
b1 b2 b3
R 1 1 1
LH 0 0 0
LB 1(b2) 1(b3) 0
Assets 2 2 1
DH 1 2 1
DB 0 1(b1) 1(b2)
E 1 -1 -1
Liabilities 2 2 1
Banks b2 and b3 are insolvent.13 We need to consider two cases:
Bankruptcy Resolution Process Begins with b3. The reserves of b3 will be
divided equally between the depositors of b3 and b2. After this step the balance
sheets are given by (Table 7):
Table 7. A3: Balance sheets after the resolution of b3
b1 b2 b3
R 1 1.5 0.5
LH 0 0 0
LB 1(b2) 0 0
Assets 2 1.5 0.5
DH 1 2 0.5
DB 0 1(b1) 0
E 1 -1.5 0
Liabilities 2 3 0.5
The reserves of b2 will be divided pro-rata between the depositors of b2 and b1.
After this step the balance sheets are given by (Table 8):
13 After a bank is liquidated it cheases to exist. However, to keep track of what hap-
pened to its depositors we assume that another bank (with the same name) has
replaced it where households can deposit their liquidation proceeds.
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Table 8. A4: Balance sheets after the resolution of b2
b1 b2 b3
R 1.5 1 0.5
LH 0 0 0
LB 0 0 0
Assets 1.5 1 0.5
DH 1 1 0.5
DB 0 0 0
E 0.5 0 0
Liabilities 1.5 1 0.5
The process has been completed.
Bankruptcy Resolution Process Begins with b2. The reserves and deposits
in b3 of b2 will be divided pro-rata between the depositors of b2 and b1. The
depositors of b2 will receive 2/3 in reserves (keep them as deposits) and 2/3 in
deposits in b3. b1 will receive 1/3 in reserves and 1/3 in deposits in b3. After this
step the balance sheets are given by (Table 9):
Table 9. A5: Balance sheets after the resolution of b2
b1 b2 b3
R 4/3 2/3 1
LH 0 0 0
LB 1/3(b3) 0 0
Assets 5/3 2/3 1
DH 1 2/3 5/3
DB 0 0 1/3(b1)
E 2/3 0 -1
Liabilities 5/3 2/3 1
The reserves of b3 will be divided pro rata between the depositors of b2
depositors of b3 and b1. Depositors of b3 will receive 1/2 in reserves, depositors
of b2 will receive 1/3 in reserves and b1 will receive 1/6 in reserves. After this
step the balance sheets are given by (Table 10):
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Table 10. A6: Balance sheets after the resolution of b3
b1 b2 b3
R 1.5 1 0.5
LH 0 0 0
LB 0 0 0
Assets 1.5 1 0.5
DH 1 1 0.5
DB 0 0 0
E 0.5 0 0
Liabilities 1.5 1 0.5
The process has been completed. The results for the two cases are identical.
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